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Effects of sex preference and social pressure on fertility in 
changing Japanese families 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. This study explored how social pressure related to parental preference for 
the sex of their children affects fertility. Pre-war and post-war generations were 
compared using individual level data previously collected in Japan in 2002. In the 
pre-war generation, if the first child was a daughter, the total number of children 
tended to increase not only when the mother preferred a son, but also when the 
mother did not have a preference for either gender. This tendency was not observed 
for the post-war generation. Results suggest that social pressure related to giving 
birth to a son led to high fertility in the pre-war generation; however, fertility was 
not influenced by social pressure in the post-war generation. This was because of a 
change in the influence of the traditional marriage system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely acknowledged that parental preferences for the sex of their 
children exist (e.g., Ben-Porath and Welch, 1976, 1980; Behrman, 1988; Behrman et 
al., 1986; Leung, 1988). This topic has triggered a significant amount of research 
regarding the underlying reasons for these preferences and effects on family 
structure (e.g., Arnold and Liu, 1986; Arnold and Zhaoxiang, 1986; Dahl and 
Moretti, 2008; Das, 1987; Leung, 1991, 1994; Lundberg, 2005)1. The relationship 
between son preference and fertility is considered to be among the major issues. 
From the viewpoint of traditional economics, fertility is dependent on the female‟s 
decision (e.g., Becker, 1965; Cigno, 1991; Galor and Weil, 1996). For example, due to 
a substitution effect, an increase in female wages results in an increase in female 
labor supply and a reduction in demand for children (Becker, 1965). Within the 
framework of traditional theory, Ahn and Mira (2002) have posited that income 
effect prevails over substitution effect in the process of economic growth. If this is 
true, considering the stage of economic development is important when 
investigating fertility2. 
In the field of economics, researchers have focused not only on individual 
decision making but also on the attitudes of others when analyzing human behavior 
(Becker and Murphy, 2000). In pre-war Japan, family members were expected to 
subordinate their individual interests to those of the family as a whole (Hendry, 
1981). “Women were taught from an early age that their prime duty should be 
obedience: first to their father, then to their husband and husband‟s parents, and 
finally when widowed, to their son” (Hendry, 1981, p. 21). If a female did not obey 
the males in a family, she would be informally sanctioned by family members. This 
was an informal rule within a family and thus the social norm. More broadly stated, 
if members of a tightly knit group went against the social norm formed through long 
term interpersonal relationships, they suffered social ostracism3. The cost of social 
                                                   
1 The one-child policy instituted by the Chinese government resulted in sex-selective 
abortions (Ebenstein, 2010). Especially in the countryside of China, sex-selective 
abortion was commonly observed (Zeng et al., 1993; Chu, 2001).  
2 According to Qian (2008), an increase in female income leads to mitigation of the 
distortion of the sex ratio at birth in China. 
3 The social norm remains, to a certain extent, in effect in Japan, although formal rule 
plays an important role (Yamamura, 2008a, 2008b).  
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ostracism was significant in the family or community, which were both 
characterized by continuous and intensive personal interaction (Hayami, 2001). In 
this paper, this cost is regarded as the degree of social pressure. Social pressure 
depends to a great extent on the sociocultural and anthropological background of 
society. Hence, fertility is influenced not only by individual preference but also by 
social pressure, which varies according to the sociocultural condition4. 
Sociocultural conditions play a critical role in determining economic behavior, 
but the importance of this role has gradually decreased over time as an outcome of 
economic development (e.g., Greif, 1994, 2002; Hayami, 1998). Social pressure 
seems to lessen as a result of the diffusion of market-based transactions. If this is 
the case, economic development decreases the social pressure effect on fertility. 
Kureishi and Wakabayshi (2011) provided evidence that parents of the pre-war 
generation preferred a son. However, the son preference disappeared in the 
post-war generation, indicating that son preference had weakened in Japan. The 
dynamic process involving the social pressure effect on fertility has not been 
sufficiently investigated in existing research. It is widely acknowledged that Japan 
has experienced rapid economic growth during the post-World War II years. Income 
level, family structure, and interpersonal relations within communities in Japan 
have changed significantly in this period (Hendry, 1981). Therefore, it is 
appropriate to explore changes in income and social pressure as related to fertility 
in modern Japan. This study used individual level data to examine how not only a 
mother‟s preference but also social pressure influence fertility, after controlling for a 
mother‟s job status and education5. Furthermore, changes in these effects were 
explored by comparing pre-war and post-war generations. In addition, to clarify who 
exerts this pressure, the role of go-betweens in the traditional system of marriage in 
Japan was explored. 
 
2. Change of Conditions in Japan  
 
                                                   
4 Individual preference appears to be affected by family members‟ characteristics. 
Kawaguchi and Miyazaki (2009) found that men raised by full-time working mothers 
were less likely to have working wives.  
5 The social position and role of women have also changed remarkably in this period. In 
this regard, Spain is similar to Japan. For example, Gutierrez-Domenech (2008) has 
focused on the labor market when exploring marriage and fertility.  
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2.1. Relationships within a family 
Before the World War II period, each member of a family was expected to 
subordinate any individual interests to those of the family. Until the mid-19th 
century, property was regarded as belonging to the family as a whole (Hendry, 1981). 
The affairs of the family were managed ultimately by its head. “The principals were 
expected to agree with the choice of their elders, and it was not considered quite 
proper for a son, and particularly for a daughter, to express too strong an opinion on 
the selection of the parents” (Hendry, 1981, p. 17). That is, parents influenced their 
child‟s decision making in general. Primogeniture became predominant during the 
18–19th century and was institutionalized in the Meiji Civil Code (Article 970). The 
law of inheritance stipulated that all household property and authority should pass 
to the eldest son. The successor, the eldest son, was accorded deferential treatment 
next only to that of the head of the house. Under such conditions, parents were 
thought to prefer sons so as to provide heirs for the succeeding generation.  
In the post-war period, legislation gave all sons and daughters equal rights to 
inherit. Opportunity for higher education for women had increased and so had 
opportunities to take on prestigious and lucrative employment. As stated in the 
Constitution, women have been given the legal status of full and equal partners in 
marriage. Given these changes, “it seems that there is less emphasis on this 
successor ‟s being the eldest son than there used to be, and other siblings usually 
receive a share of the inheritance in the form of education, financial help with a 
house or business, or a bridal trousseau” (Hendry, 1981, p. 28–29).  
The greatest single factor to have influenced the Japanese way of life was 
defeat in World War II, with the introduction of democracy and other Western ideals 
into the legal and educational systems (Hendry, 1981). Apart from change of law, 
unprecedented economic growth started after World War II. Hence, economic 
conditions such as income level were different between the pre-war and post-war 
generations, which appeared to change the structure of the family and thus 
relationships between family members. These drastic changes are thought to have 
had an impact on determinants of fertility. 
 
2.2. Role of go-betweens 
Marriage is classified into two types in Japan: modern era love marriage, which 
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reflects the spirit of the post-war Constitution, and arranged marriage, which is 
associated with a traditional aspect of the family system (Hendry, 1981). In the case 
of love marriage, individuals search for their own partners. In arranged marriages, 
individuals choose their partners at an introductory meeting arranged by a 
prospective go-between.  
As a son or daughter reaches marriageable age, “members of the family initiate 
discreet inquiries, among their friends and relatives, to see whether a suitable 
partner might not be known to one of them” (Hendry, 1981). A family member ‟s 
friend or relative becomes the go-between and arranges the meeting. If the 
arrangement leads to the individuals getting married, “the go-between who brought 
the couple together must mediate in case of dispute…The couple usually visits their 
go-between for a few years after marriage … they also invite the go-between to the 
celebration following the birth of the first child” (Hendry, 1981). This implies that 
the go-between is assumed to play the role of a guarantor, thereby influencing the 
decision making of the couple. That is, compared with love marriages, arranged 
marriages are more likely to be affected by social pressure from a go-between. 
 
3. Methods 
 
 Data  
This paper used individual level data including information such as age, years 
of education, marital status, and number of children6. In addition, age and spouses‟ 
years of education were included. These data were compiled from the National 
Survey: “Trails of Families in Post-War Japan” (TFPWJ hereafter) conducted in all 
parts of Japan in 2002. Five thousand adult females (born between 1920 and 1969, 
aged 32 to 81 years) were invited to participate in a survey with stratified two-stage 
random sampling. The survey collected data on 3475 adults, with a response rate of 
69.5%.  
 
                                                   
6 Data for this secondary analysis are from the National Survey: “Trails of Families in 
Post-War Japan.” These data were designed by the Japan Society of Family Sociology. 
The research was subcontracted to Shin Joho Center Inc. and carried out in 2002. Data 
were provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social 
Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
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<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
The construction of samples used in this research is shown in Table 1. The 
original sample contained 3475 observations. Among these observations, 3351 had 
experienced marriage. The sample size became 3189 when limited to those who had 
offspring. Hence, observations of infertile females were discarded. In addition, I 
omitted the observations without valid answers for respondents‟ and spouses‟ 
characteristics. Furthermore, the observations of those who were child-bearing age7 
were omitted, reducing the sample size to 2079. The sample was therefore restricted 
to females who had been fertile before their mid-40s, but could not bear a child in 
2002. This sample was used for estimation, and results are reported in Tables 3 and 
6.  
Comparisons of variables used for estimation between pre-war and post-war 
generations are shown in Table 2. The dependent variable was the total number of 
children. Total number of children for the post-war generation was smaller than for 
the pre-war generation, reflecting a birth rate decline. Independent variables are 
also shown in Table 2. To measure preference for a son I used the following question: 
“For your first child, which did you want to have, a boy or girl?” Respondents could 
choose from a numbered list, which included “boy,” “girl,” “either,” and “I didn‟t want 
a child.” According to Dahl and Moretti (2008), a first-born son is more likely to be 
living with a father compared to a first-born daughter, leading fathers to prefer sons. 
Thus, the likelihood of living with a mother is thought to be associated with the 
mother‟s preference.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
Figure 1(a) reveals that the number of married children living with their 
mothers in the post-war generation was lower than in the pre-war generation. 
Figure 1(b) indicates that the eldest son was more likely than other children in the 
family to live with his mother, but this tendency was less in the post-war generation. 
The decline of the likelihood that the eldest son lived with his mother was 
consistent with the decline of preference for a son.  
                                                   
7 Furthermore, women of child-bearing age were defined as those who were born after 
1955. That is, in 2002, they were younger than 47 years old. 
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The key variable of sex of the first child was coded 1 if the first child was male; 
otherwise, it was 0. To control for the probability of pregnancy, respondents‟ and 
spouses‟ ages at marriage as well as dummy variables for divorce and husband‟s 
death were included. Economic condition of the household was indicated by dummy 
variables for a husband‟s having experienced bankruptcy or job loss, first 
professional job occupation8, and husband‟s job9. Years of education for wives and 
husbands were incorporated to capture the human capital effect. Furthermore, 
cohort dummies were included to control for age effect10. 
  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
For the purpose of examining the effect of changes in Japanese society on 
fertility, observations were divided into pre-war generation (husband born before 
1945) and post-war generation (husband born after 1946), 1522 and 560 
observations, respectively11. Divided observations were used for the regression 
estimation, and results are shown in Table 4. However, it was difficult to exactly 
divide the generation to capture the changes in perception and sociocultural 
condition because the generation born during the war possibly attended school in 
the post-war period12. Hence, alternative definitions regarding the generations were 
                                                   
8 In the questionnaire, professional occupation was defined as a job that requires highly 
specialized knowledge, such as doctor, lawyer, researcher, engineer/technical expert, 
reporter, writer, artist, teacher, nurse, pharmacist, child caretaker, and social worker. 
9 The husband‟s job was considered the professional occupation. Therefore, for the 
purpose of constructing husband‟s job dummies, I used the question “Which of the 
following describes your spouse‟s occupation when you married him?” Respondents 
chose from among a list, which included “regular employee of a large corporation (500 or 
more employees),” “regular employee of a small/medium corporation (less than 500 
employees),” “self-employed in agriculture,” “self-employed in areas other than 
agriculture,” “non-regular employee,” “He did not have a job.” Husband‟s job dummies 
were included when estimations were conducted but not reported in Tables 3, 4, or 5. 
10 Cohorts were divided into 5 groups based on those who were born in (1) 1920–1929, 
(2) 1930–1939, (3) 1940–1949, (4) 1950–1959, and (5) 1960–1969. 
11 The family head, ordinarily the husband, played an important role in household 
decision making in the pre-war period. The role of the husband changed, and his 
influence declined in the post-war period. It is important to consider such changes in 
environment when birth of children is considered. Hence, pre-war and post-war 
generations were divided based on the husband‟s birth year.   
12 Kureishi and Wakabayashi (2011) used the same data set as this study to compare 
the sex preference among different generations. They divided the sample into 
1920–1939, 1940–1954, and 1955–1969 cohort groups. 
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used when I conducted the estimation reported in Tables 5 and 613. As seen in Table 
2, respondents‟ average age at marriage in the post-war generation was higher than 
in the pre-war generation, whereas the age of husbands in the post-war generation 
was lower than in the pre-war generation. This suggests that female work 
opportunities increased in the post-war period, resulting in marriage postponement. 
The divorce rate was approximately 3% for both the pre-war and post-war 
generations, considered to be low. Death rate for husbands in the pre-war 
generation was 16.3%, distinctly higher than the 3.1% for the post-war generation. 
This finding might reflect that husbands born in the pre-war period were older than 
age 57 in 2002 when the survey was conducted; therefore, likelihood of death was 
higher than in the younger generation. Regarding bankruptcy or job loss, there was 
little difference between the pre-war generation (16.0%) and post-war generation 
(18.3%). I found it interesting that the percentage of professional occupations in the 
post-war generation was approximately one and a half times higher than in the 
pre-war generation, 16.4% and 11.2%, respectively. This suggests that post-war 
generation females were more likely than pre-war generation females to enter the 
labor market as specialists. Data on average years of education revealed that post- 
war generation females were more educated than pre-war generation females. Thus, 
the increase of specialists among females was due to the fact that females obtained 
highly specialized knowledge through education. Furthermore, rate of preference 
for a son (30.6%) was distinctly higher than preference for daughter (17.8%) in the 
pre-war generation, suggesting that son preference existed for the pre-war 
generation. The rate of preference for a son decreased to 23.9%, while that for a 
daughter increased to 22.8%. As a result, there was little difference between 
preference for a son or daughter in the post-war generation. This change in sex 
preference is in line with Kureishi and Wakabayashi (2011). 
 
3.2. Analyses 
I examined the relationship between the social pressure of preference for the 
birth of a son with fertility. I focused on the effect of the sex of the first child on total 
                                                   
13 In the definitions for Table 5, pre-war and post-war generations are defined as 
husbands born before 1935 and husbands born after 1936, respectively. In the 
definitions for Table 6, pre-war and post-war generations are defined as husbands born 
before 1925 and husbands born after 1926, respectively. 
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number of children. The estimated function takes the following form:  
 
(Total number of children-1) im = 0  + 1 (first male) im  + 2 (age at marriage)im + 
3(husband‟s age at marriage)im + 4 (divorce)im + 5 (husband‟s death)im + 
6(bankruptcy)im + 7 (professional)im + 8 (education)im  + 9 (husband‟s 
education)im  + em + uim 
where (Total number of children -1) im represents the dependent variable for 
individual i and spouse m. The sample comprised females who had at least one child. 
The number of children born after the first child was examined. Hence, the 
dependent variable takes 0 if the female did not bear a child after the first child. ‟s 
represents regression parameters, em captures spouse‟s job, represented by dummy 
variables, and uim represents the error term.  
This study aimed to examine how parents make a decision about number of 
children after the first child is born. Hence, observations of infertile females were 
discarded. This paper used count data, thus the dependent variable did not take 
negative values. Furthermore, the data used in this paper has two characteristics: 
“there is no natural a priori upper bound, and the outcome will be zero for at least 
some members of the population” (Wooldridge 2002, p. 645). In this case, as 
suggested by Wooldridge (2002), the Poisson model is more appropriate than the 
OLS model. Hence, I conducted the Poisson estimation. The key variable was First 
male, given a value of 1 if the first child was male, otherwise it was 0. The sample 
was divided into three groups including (1) mother‟s preference for a son, (2) 
mother‟s preference for a daughter, and (3) either. Regarding preference for a son, 
the expected sign for First male was negative mainly due to the mother‟s preference. 
That is, the mother has no incentive to have a baby if she preferred a son and the 
first child was male. As for preference for a daughter, the expected sign for First 
male was positive because the mother preferred a daughter. The mother has an 
incentive to have a baby if she preferred a daughter and the first child was male. 
With respect to the “either” group, the negative sign for First male implies that 
social pressure leads to fewer children by birth of a son since the mother did not 
prefer either a son or daughter. 
The results using observations of both the pre-war and post-war generations 
are reported in Table 3. The sample was divided into pre-war and post-war 
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generations. Results are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6. The Poisson estimations were 
then conducted to compare social pressure effects between pre-war and post-war 
generations. The preference of surrounding people such as family and relatives on 
fertility seemed to be more influential for the pre-war generation than for the 
post-war generation in Japan. To put it another way, social pressure was greater for 
the pre-war generation than for the post-war generation. Hence, First male is 
expected to take the negative sign, and its absolute value is larger for the pre-war 
generation than for the post-war generation when mothers preferred a son. 
Furthermore, First male is anticipated to take the negative sign for the pre-war 
generation but is ambiguous for the post-war generation when mothers preferred 
either gender. Apart from First male, as explained earlier, various control variables 
were included to control for age at marriage, marital status, incidents after 
marriage, job, and education. 
The estimations above do not clarify who exerts pressure on the household‟s 
decision about fertility. As briefly explained in subsection 2.2., the couple in an 
arranged marriage is likely to be influenced by the go-between. If a relative becomes 
the go-between, the effect appears to be greater because that person has a blood 
relationship with the husband or wife. Hence, I split the sample of those who 
belonged to the pre-war generation with neutral preference into two groups: couples 
with a relative as the go-between and couples without a relative as the go-between. 
Then, I compared the effect of First male on fertility between the two groups. If 
social pressure mainly comes from go-betweens who are relatives, the coefficient of 
First male will take the negative sign for the group with relatives as the 
go-betweens. Furthermore, First male will have a greater effect in the group with 
relatives as go-betweens than in the other group. The results are presented in Table 
7. 
 
4. Results 
 
Estimation results using all samples are reported in Table 3. Results of 
pre-war and post-war generations are exhibited in Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
I will discuss results of Table 3 and focus on results of First male, shown in the 
first row. As anticipated, as shown in column (1), signs for First male were negative 
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and statistically significant at the 1% level when respondents preferred a son. In 
column (2), First male was positive when respondents preferred a daughter, but 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that son preference has a critical effect on 
fertility, but daughter preference does not influence fertility. I interpret this as 
suggesting that the social pressure to bear a boy reinforced the incentive to bear a 
boy and reduced the incentive to bear a girl. It is interesting to observe that First 
male takes a significant negative sign for the “either” group as presented in column 
(3). The absolute value of First male is 0.20 in column (1). This implies that those 
who had a daughter as the first child have a 0.20 larger number of children than 
those who had a son as the first child when the sample is restricted to the son 
preference group. The absolute value of First male is 0.06 in column (3). This 
implies that those who had a daughter as the first child have a 0.06 larger number 
of children than those who had a son as the first child when the sample is restricted 
to the “either” group. It follows from this that social pressure significantly increases 
number of children when the first child is a daughter. 
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
In Table 3, regarding age at marriage and husband‟s age at marriage, signs 
were negative in all estimations. Age at marriage is statistically significant in 
columns (1) and (2). It follows that the older women were, the fewer children they 
had. This is because number of children is limited by the child-bearing age of 
women. On the other hand, husband‟s age at marriage is statistically significant 
only for the daughter preference group, as shown in column (2). Concerning the 
husband‟s age, the sexual desire and stamina needed to have a baby decrease as 
men become older even if there is no strict age limitation as there is for women. 
However, the incentive to have a child possibly neutralizes the negative effect of the 
husband‟s age. Therefore, results for husband‟s age at marriage reflect the degree of 
incentive to have a child. Husbands in the son preference and “either” groups are 
considered to have a greater incentive to have a child than those in the daughter 
preference group. This seems to neutralize the negative effect of husband‟s age at 
marriage.  
Divorce yielded significant negative signs only for the daughter preference 
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group14 . This suggests that divorce after birth of the first child reduces the 
likelihood that females bear children, resulting in a decline in fertility only when 
women prefer a daughter. However, this does not hold when women prefer a son or 
do not have a sex preference. I interpret this as meaning that a son preference and 
also social pressure to have a son leads to a higher incentive to bear a child, and 
thus children are born before unexpected incidents.  
It is very interesting that education produced positive signs in all estimations 
and is significant in column (1). Typically, years of education is positively correlated 
with rise in wages. The data revealed that a rise in female wages led to increased 
fertility, which is contrary to fundamental theory (Becker, 1965). This is, however, 
consistent with the argument of Ahn and Mira (2002): at sufficiently high female 
wage levels, a wage increase leads to an increase in fertility as the income effect 
supersedes the substitution effect. Signs for other variables were not stable, and 
their effect on fertility was ambiguous.  
 
 
4.2. Comparison between pre-war and post-war generations 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 are used to compare the determinants of fertility between 
pre-war and post-war generations. These tables show the results of pre-war and 
post-war generations in columns (1)–(3) and columns (4)–(6), respectively. Here, I 
concentrate focus on First male, regarded as the key variable. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
First male produced significant negative signs for son preference and “either” 
groups in the pre-war generation, while it did not produce significance for any 
groups in the post-war generation. It appears that the social pressure for birth of a 
son existed in the pre-war generation but disappeared in the post-war generation. 
On the other hand, daughter preference did not influence fertility, implying that 
daughter preference did not provide sufficient incentive to bear a daughter, or the 
incentive to bear a daughter was neutralized by the social pressure to bear a boy. I 
                                                   
14 In Western countries, there are many unmarried mothers, so it is important to 
consider them (Dahl and Moretti, 2008). In TFPWJ data, however, unmarried mothers 
were very rare (only 3 cases were observed), so they were omitted.  
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interpret the findings in son preference and “either” groups as suggesting that 
interpersonal relationships within a family or between neighbors became weaker, 
resulting in decreased social pressure on decision making. Changes in interpersonal 
relationships and family structure have been reported by anthropologists (Hendry, 
1981) and can be explained by social pressure from the viewpoint of economics. In 
the pre-war generation group, the absolute value of First male was 0.19 and 0.09 for 
son-preference and “either” groups, respectively. This suggests that social pressure 
to have a son decreased the incentive to bear a child in the pre-war generation when 
the first child was a son, although the social pressure effect was smaller than the 
son-preference effect. 
 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
 
Regarding a robustness check of results presented in Table 4, I will discuss 
Tables 5 and 6. In Table 5, First male continued to yield a significant negative sign 
for son preference and “either” groups in the pre-war generation, but it did not yield 
a significant sign in the post-war generation. Table 6 shows similar results, 
although, as suggested in column (4), First male yielded a significant negative sign 
in the post-war generation. Considering the statistical analysis based on the 
individual data as a whole, the social pressure of bearing a son affected fertility in 
the pre-war generation, but hardly influenced it in the post-war generation. This is 
probably due to the change in interpersonal relationships as a result of economic 
development in Japan.  
To clarify who exerts pressure on household decision making, I concentrate 
focus on couples belonging to the pre-war generation without preference for either 
gender. In columns (1) and (4) of Table 7, the pre-war generation is defined as the 
husband‟s birth year before 1945. In columns (2) and (5), the pre-war generation is 
defined as the husband‟s birth year before 1935. In columns (3) and (6), the pre-war 
generation is defined as the husband‟s birth year before 1925. Table 7 presents the 
results for groups with relatives as go-betweens in columns (1), (2), and (3). Results 
for groups without relatives as go-betweens are in columns (4), (5), and (6). The 
coefficient of First male takes the significant negative sign in columns (1)-(3). This 
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suggests that the sex of the first child affects number of children for couples with a 
relative as the go-between even when parents do not have a preference for either 
gender. On the other hand, the coefficient of First male takes the negative sign in 
columns (4)-(6). However, it is statistically significant only in column (6). 
Furthermore, its absolute values in columns (1)-(3) are larger than those in columns 
(4)-(6). These findings indicate that the couples whose marriages were not arranged 
by relatives as go-betweens were not influenced by social pressure. Results in Table 
7 suggest that relatives acting as go-betweens exert pressure on their arranged 
marriage couples to give birth to a boy.  
The combined results of Tables 3-7 lead me to conclude that social pressure 
has an effect on married couple‟s decisions about fertility in the pre-war generation, 
but this effect is not observed in the post-war generation. Furthermore, relatives as 
go-betweens play a critical role in exerting this pressure. From this, I derive the 
argument that social pressure is generated by a traditional marriage system. Thus, 
couple‟s decisions about fertility depend in part on the system used in older 
generations. However, the system has evolved, and therefore social pressure now 
has a diminished influence on couple‟s decision making.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As discussed in existing literature, the decision to have a child is made by parents 
and is an individual issue. Anthropological works suggest, however, that close 
relationships with family and neighbors are associated with the various facets of 
individual decision making. Hence, fertility appears to be influenced by social 
pressure. On the other hand, social pressure within a tightly knit society based on 
long-term intensive personal interaction seems to lessen due to the diffusion of 
market based transaction and economic growth. If this is the case, the role played 
by social pressure changes over time in the long-term economic development process. 
Little is known, however, about the dynamic process of the effect of social pressure 
on fertility. This paper explored this process in the post-World War II period of 
Japan by using individual level data. The major finding was as follows: If the first 
child was a daughter, the number of children tended to increase not only when the 
mother preferred a son but also when the mother did not have a preference for 
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either gender. This was observed in the pre-war generation but not in the post-war 
generation. Social pressure makes an impact on fertility. However, social pressure 
has decreased as a consequence of economic development. Relatives as go-betweens 
exert social pressure. It follows from this that the parents‟ decision of how many 
children to have was affected by pressure from go-betweens under the traditional 
marriage system in Japan. Once the system declined in importance, the pressure 
diminished and parents‟ decisions were not influenced by others. This reveals that 
the degree to which the dependence on surrounding people in individual decision 
making changes in the process of institutional change. 
Compared to the existing literature, the main innovation of this paper involves 
understanding how not only individual sex preference but also social pressure is 
related to fertility in the process of economic development. This research focused on 
the change in social pressure related to the evolution of the marriage system in a 
country. Marriage systems seem to vary according to the historical and cultural 
background of the society. It would be of value to compare social pressures between 
places with different cultures and histories. To this end, an examination of social 
pressure on fertility in countries with different marriage systems is suggested for 
future research.  
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(a) Percentages of married children living with their mothers  
 
 
(b) Percentage of married children living with their mothers by gender  
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(c) Percentage of married children living with divorced mothers by gender  
 
Fig.1 Probability of married children living with their mothers. 
Note. Panel (b) shows the composition of Panel (a). 
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Table 1.  Construction of Research Sample 
 Description Number in Sample 
 
Original Sample 
 
 3475 
Respondent has been married a 
 
3351 
Respondent has offspring 
 
3189 
Characteristics about self and spouse supplied by 
respondent. Furthermore, women of childbearing age, 
who were born after 1955, are omitted (variables 
appear in Table 2) . 
2079  b 
Note.  
a. The 3 samples for unmarried mothers were omitted.  
b. (I) Sample was used for estimations reported in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
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    Table 2.  Comparison of Variables Between Pre-war and Post-war Generations a  
Variables Pre-war Post-war 
Total number of children b 
 
2.4 2.2 
First child was male (%) 
 
  52.0  50.9 
Average age at marriage 
 
  24.4  25.4 
Average age of husband at marriage   28.1  26.8 
 
Experienced divorce after birth of first 
child (%) 
   2.9   2.7 
Experienced husband‟s death after birth 
of first child (%) 
  16.3   3.1 
Husband experienced bankruptcy or job 
loss during marriage (%) 
  16.1  18.3 
First job was a professional occupationc 
(%) 
  11.2  16.4 
Average years of education 
 
  11.0  12.1 
Husband‟s average years of education 
 
  11.5  12.6 
Preference for a son (%) 
 
  30.6 23.9 
Preference for a daughter (%) 
 
  17.8 22.8 
Note.  
a. Pre-war and post-war generations are defined as husbands born before 1945 and 
husbands born after 1946, respectively. 
b. Total number of children was the dependent variable. 
c. In the questionnaire, professional occupation was defined as a job that requires highly 
specialized knowledge, for example, doctor, lawyer, researcher, engineer/technical 
expert, reporter, writer, artist, teacher, nurse, pharmacist, child caretaker, or social 
worker.  
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Table 3.  Comparison of Fertility Determinants Among Preferences for a Son, 
Daughter and Neutral (Poisson estimation) 
         Dependent variable: Number of children born after the first child. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * ,** 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In all 
estimations, husband‟s job dummies, cohort dummies are included, but not reported.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables    (1)   (2) (3) 
 Preference 
for a son 
Preferen
ce for a 
daughter 
Either 
First child was male (Yes = 1): dummy -0.20*** 
(-3.43) 
0.03 
(0.57) 
-0.06* 
(-1.70) 
Age at marriage 
 
 -0.02** 
(-2.18) 
 -0.02** 
(-2.33) 
 -0.01 
(-1.25) 
Age of husband at marriage -0.006 
(-0.70) 
-0.02* 
(-1.75) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
Experienced divorce after birth of first 
child (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.08 
(0.52) 
-0.38** 
(-2.32) 
-0.16 
(-1.00) 
Experienced husband‟s death after 
birth of first child (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.07 
(1.09) 
-0.21 
(-1.59) 
-0.05 
(-0.81) 
Husband experienced bankruptcy or job 
loss during marriage (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.01 
(-0.26) 
0.10 
(1.19) 
0.05 
(1.04) 
First job was a professional occupation 
(Yes = 1) : dummy 
0.10 
(1.52) 
0.18 
(1.64) 
0.0009 
(0.02) 
Years of education 
 
0.02* 
(1.73) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
0.002 
(0.17) 
Husband‟s years of education 
 
-0.01 
(-1.27) 
-0.007 
(-0.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.20) 
Constant 
 
1.21*** 
(4.39) 
1.43*** 
(4.05) 
0.88*** 
(4.14) 
Observations 634 432 1013 
Log pseudo-likelihood -835 -536 -1305 
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Table 4.  Comparison of Fertility Determinants Among Preferences for a Son, Daughter and Neutral (Poisson estimation) 
         Dependent variable: Number of children born after the first child. 
 
Variables    (1)   (2) (3)     (4) (5) (6) 
     Pre-war generation 
 (Year of husband‟s birth < 1945) 
 Post-war generation 
(Year of husband‟s birth ≥ 1945) 
 Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either  Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either 
First child was male (Yes = 1): dummy -0.19*** 
(-2.81) 
0.03 
(0.42) 
-0.09** 
(-2.28) 
 -0.15 
(-1.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
0.02 
(0.37) 
Age at marriage 
 
 -0.03** 
(-2.35) 
 -0.02 
(-1.31) 
 -0.006 
(-0.47) 
  -0.02 
(-1.21) 
 -0.02 
(-1.01) 
 -0.04*** 
(-2.67) 
Age of husband at marriage -0.0008 
(-0.08) 
-0.03** 
(-2.03) 
-0.005 
(-0.50) 
 0.007 
(0.36) 
-0.01 
(-0.80) 
0.003 
(0.21) 
Experienced divorce after birth of first 
child (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.08 
(-0.39) 
-0.42** 
(-2.11) 
-0.20 
(-0.95) 
 0.47*** 
(2.91) 
-0.59* 
(-1.65) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
Experienced husband‟s death after 
birth of first child (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.09 
(1.21) 
-0.20 
(-1.45) 
-0.03 
(-0.46) 
 0.04 
(0.27) 
-0.79 
(-1.53) 
-0.31 
(-1.34) 
Husband experienced bankruptcy or job 
loss during marriage (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.03 
(-0.38) 
0.23** 
(2.12) 
0.07 
(1.09) 
 0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.19 
(-1.35) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
First job was a professional occupation 
(Yes = 1) : dummy 
0.13 
(1.49) 
0.21 
(1.36) 
-0.08 
(-1.22) 
 0.10 
(0.95) 
0.16 
(1.01) 
0.14* 
(1.67) 
Years of education 
 
0.02 
(1.21) 
0.01 
(0.67) 
-0.006 
(-0.41) 
 0.01 
(0.60) 
-0.003 
(-0.11) 
0.03 
(1.57) 
Husband‟s years of education 
 
0.02 
(1.21) 
-0.02 
(-0.98) 
0.004 
(0.41) 
 0.006 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.84) 
Constant 
 
1.34*** 
(4.15) 
1.50*** 
(3.22) 
0.82*** 
(3.41) 
 0.55 
(1.07) 
1.19** 
(2.24) 
1.01*** 
(2.60) 
Observations 481 288 753  153 145 262 
Log pseudo-likelihood -635 -359 -979  -196 -174 -323 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * ,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, husband‟s job dummies, cohort dummies are included, but not reported.  
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Table 5. Comparison of Fertility Determinants Among Preferences for a Son, Daughter and Neutral (Poisson estimation) 
         Dependent variable: Number of children born after the first child. 
 
Variables    (1)   (2) (3)     (4) (5) (6) 
     Pre-war generation 
 (Year of husband‟s birth < 1935) 
 Post-war generation 
(Year of husband‟s birth ≥ 1935) 
 Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either  Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either 
First child was male (Yes = 1): dummy -0.34*** 
(-3.87) 
0.20 
(1.49) 
-0.12** 
(-2.00) 
 -0.05 
(-0.80) 
-0.01 
(-0.25) 
-0.03 
(-0.77) 
Age at marriage 
 
 -0.02* 
(-1.74) 
 0.01 
(0.39) 
 -0.03** 
(-2.48) 
  -0.03** 
(-2.54) 
 -0.04*** 
(-2.82) 
 -0.02** 
(-2.33) 
Age of husband at marriage 0.007 
(0.53) 
-0.04* 
(-2.01) 
0.01 
(1.54) 
 -0.01 
(-1.30) 
-0.01 
(-0.78) 
-0.0006 
(-0.08) 
Experienced divorce after birth of first 
child (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.37 
(-1.14) 
-0.75 
(-1.39) 
-0.48 
(-1.18) 
 0.18 
(1.12) 
-0.31* 
(-1.83) 
-0.02 
(-0.18) 
Experienced husband‟s death after 
birth of first child (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.08 
(0.96) 
-0.19 
(-0.89) 
-0.08 
(-1.17) 
 0.04 
(0.49) 
-0.22 
(-1.42) 
0.03 
(0.27) 
Husband experienced bankruptcy or job 
loss during marriage (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.06 
(0.60) 
0.27** 
(2.17) 
0.02 
(0.31) 
 -0.04 
(-0.63) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.94) 
First job was a professional occupation 
(Yes = 1) : dummy 
-0.07 
(-0.58) 
-0.12 
(-0.45) 
-0.09 
(-0.98) 
 0.15* 
(1.92) 
0.32*** 
(2.65) 
0.05 
(0.82) 
Years of education 
 
0.01 
(055) 
-0.007 
(-0.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.77) 
 0.03 
(1.59) 
0.008 
(0.34) 
0.01 
(1.00) 
Husband‟s years of education 
 
-0.01 
(-0.62) 
-0.04 
(-1.35) 
0.009 
(0.51) 
 -0.007 
(-0.50) 
0.004 
(0.24) 
-0.006 
(-0.59) 
Constant 
 
1.01** 
(2.42) 
1.76*** 
(2.77) 
0.99*** 
(2.76) 
 1.32*** 
(3.80) 
1.36*** 
(3.34) 
2.03*** 
(3.54) 
Observations 247 116 379  387 316 634 
Log pseudo-likelihood -335 -143 -499  -491 -387 -795 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * ,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, husband‟s job dummies, cohort dummies are included, but not reported.  
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Table 6.  Comparison of Fertility Determinants Among Preferences for a Son, Daughter and Neutral (Poisson estimation) 
         Dependent variable: Number of children born after the first child. 
Variables    (1)   (2) (3)     (4) (5) (6) 
     Pre-war generation 
 (Year of husband‟s birth < 1925) 
 Post-war generation 
(Year of husband‟s birth ≥1925) 
 Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either  Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either 
First child was male (Yes = 1): dummy -0.40*** 
(-3.52) 
0.55 
(1.42) 
-0.38*** 
(-3.00) 
 -0.16** 
(-2.20) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
-0.01 
(-0.30) 
Age at marriage 
 
 -0.01 
(-0.68) 
 -0.04 
(-0.96) 
 -0.04* 
(-1.91) 
  -0.03** 
(-2.63) 
 -0.03** 
(-2.50) 
 -0.007 
(-0.59) 
Age of husband at marriage -0.0005 
(-0.03) 
-0.26 
(-1.13) 
0.03** 
(2.36) 
 -0.01 
(-1.00) 
-0.01 
(-1.21) 
-0.01 
(-1.32) 
Experienced divorce after birth of first 
child (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.29 
(-1.50) 
____ -0.04 
(-0.06) 
 0.09 
(0.61) 
-0.39** 
(-2.40) 
-0.15 
(-1.05) 
Experienced husband‟s death after 
birth of first child (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.15 
(1.25) 
0.27 
(0.35) 
-0.22* 
(-1.85) 
 0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.19 
(-1.58) 
-0.04 
(-0.60) 
Husband experienced bankruptcy or job 
loss during marriage (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.02 
(-0.17) 
-10.1*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.10 
(-0.64) 
 -0.007 
(-0.10) 
0.11 
(1.28) 
0.07 
(1.32) 
First job was a professional occupation 
(Yes = 1) : dummy 
0.34 
(1.52) 
1.59 
(1.22) 
-0.23 
(-1.35) 
 0.09 
(1.26) 
0.22** 
(2.02) 
0.03 
(0.71) 
Years of education 
 
0.03 
(0.91) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.08** 
(2.07) 
 0.02 
(1.56) 
0.007 
(0.34) 
-0.005 
(-0.44) 
Husband‟s years of education 
 
-0.08** 
(-2.17) 
-0.47** 
(-1.96) 
-0.03 
(-1.18) 
 -0.006 
(-0.51) 
0.002 
(0.17) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
Constant 
 
1.47*** 
(2.66) 
12.2** 
(2.23) 
0.29 
(0.49) 
 1.37*** 
(4.48) 
1.26*** 
(3.67) 
0.91*** 
(4.42) 
Observations 82 24 112  552 408 901 
Log pseudo-likelihood -114 -22 -161  -716 -377 -1136 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * ,** and *** denote significance at the 10 %, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, husband‟s job dummies, cohort dummies are included, but not reported. In column (2), results 
for the dummy of experienced divorce after birth of the first child cannot be reported because its effect is completely captured by the 
cohort dummies. „Experienced divorce after birth of first child‟ is omitted because of perfect collinearity with cohort dummies. 
 27 
Table 7.  Comparison of Fertility Determinants Between Marriages With and Without Relatives as Go-Betweens for the Pre-war 
Generation With Neutral Preference  
(Poisson estimation) 
         Dependent variable: Number of children born after the first child. 
Variables    (1)   (2) (3)     (4) (5) (6) 
    With relative as a go-between       Without relative as a go-between 
 Year of 
husband‟s 
birth < 
1945 
Year of 
husband‟s 
birth < 
1935 
Year of 
husband‟
s birth < 
1925 
 Year of 
husband‟s 
birth < 
1945 
Year of 
husband‟s 
birth < 
1935 
Year of 
husband‟s 
birth < 1925 
First child was male (Yes = 1): dummy -0.10* 
(-1.95) 
-0.17** 
(-2.19) 
-0.31** 
(-2.05) 
 -0.06 
(-1.50) 
-0.01 
(-0.21) 
-0.24* 
(-1.67) 
Age at marriage 
 
 -0.02** 
(-2.05) 
 -0.03** 
(-2.31) 
 -0.03 
(-0.90) 
  -0.006 
(-0.60) 
 -0.02* 
(-1.86) 
 -0.04* 
(-1.70) 
Age of husband at marriage 0.0009 
(0.10) 
0.007 
(0.63) 
0.01 
(0.56) 
 -0.004 
(-0.49) 
0.01 
(1.38) 
0.04** 
(2.51) 
Experienced divorce after birth of first 
child (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.37 
(-1.03) 
-0.79 
(-1.01) 
-21.9*** 
(-21.3) 
 -0.17 
(-0.89) 
-0.43 
(-1.13) 
0.49 
(1.56) 
Experienced husband‟s death after 
birth of first child (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.04 
(-0.52) 
-0.05 
(-0.67) 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
 -0.02 
(-0.47) 
-0.06 
(-0.91) 
-0.29** 
(-2.09) 
Husband experienced bankruptcy or job 
loss during marriage (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.04 
(0.70) 
0.10 
(1.23) 
0.09 
(0.52) 
 0.03 
(0.68) 
-0.03 
(-0.34) 
-0.19 
(-1.01) 
First job was a professional occupation 
(Yes = 1) : dummy 
-0.02 
(-0.32) 
0.08 
(0.77) 
-0.15 
(-0.80) 
 -0.001 
(-0.02) 
-0.09 
(-1.01) 
-0.21 
(-1.05) 
Years of education 
 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
-0.006 
(-0.22) 
0.07 
(1.63) 
 -0.007 
(-0.50) 
-0.02 
(-1.00) 
0.05 
(1.05) 
Husband‟s years of education 
 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
-0.01 
(-1.01) 
-0.03 
(-1.07) 
 0.003 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(1.30) 
-0.02 
(-0.81) 
Constant 
 
0.42 
(1.48) 
0.89** 
(2.03) 
-0.004* 
(-0.00) 
 0.21 
(0.90) 
0.18 
(0.56) 
-030 
(-0.59) 
Observations 294 153 53  457 226 59 
Log pseudo-likelihood -280 -146 -52  -437 -216 -59 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * ,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, husband‟s job dummies, cohort dummies are included, but not reported.  
